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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4404 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES M. NASELSKY, 
       Appellant 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-10-cr-00577-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 20, 2013 
 
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 21, 2014) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 
 In 2012, defendant Charles Naselsky was convicted after trial of tax evasion, filing 
a false tax return, wire fraud, and attempt to obstruct justice, as well as aiding and 
abetting those last two offenses.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment, a three-year term of 
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supervised release, restitution of $423,345, and a special assessment of $900.  Naselsky 
now challenges his convictions for wire fraud and certain aspects of his sentence.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the conviction and sentence.  
I.  
 We write primarily for the parties to the action.  Accordingly, we set forth only 
those facts necessary to our analysis.  
In 2002, Naselsky, an experienced real-estate transactional lawyer, joined the 
Philadelphia-based law firm of Cozen O’Connor as a “senior member,” a position 
considered by the firm’s management to be “equivalent of what you would have today as 
a shareholder or as a partner or senior partner . . . in a partnership kind of law firm.”  
(App. 70.)  Naselsky was paid an annual base salary with the opportunity for cash 
bonuses.  At the time of hiring, the firm provided Naselsky with a manual of employment 
policies, and he signed a form agreeing to read the manual.  Included in that manual was 
a provision (“the 2001 Cozen policy”) entitled “Professional Fees for Outside Activities,” 
which, as of May 2001, stated as follows: 
[U]nless approval is secured from the Executive Committee 
in advance, all professional fees including legal fees of any 
kind, special counsel or solicitor fees, prosecutor salaries, 
executor fees, trustee fees, director fees, consulting fees and 
teaching salaries or stipends . . . which are generated directly 
or indirectly by lawyers employed by the firm shall be 
considered to be income to and the property of the firm. 
 
(App. 663.)
1
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 At trial, the jury also saw a somewhat revised version of the Cozen policy which 
is said to date from November 20, 2010.  The parties agree that the exact date of the 
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 Among Naselsky’s longstanding clients and social acquaintances were Ravinder 
and Hardeep Chawla, brothers who, through their companies, Sant Properties and World 
Acquisitions Partners, purchased and re-sold real estate in the Philadelphia market.  In 
2005, Naselsky contacted David Grasso, a real-estate developer, to see if he was 
interested in selling a valuable property located at 1500 Walnut Street in Philadelphia to 
the Chawlas.  Grasso offered to sell the building for $35 million, which the Chawlas 
accepted.  Naselsky represented Grasso throughout the transaction.  The Chawlas, 
however, also regarded Naselsky as having “facilitate[d]” the transaction on their behalf, 
(App. 193), insofar as Naselsky was able to broker a crucial pre-closing extension from 
Grasso in return for a $600,000 investment by the Chawlas in Grasso’s film production 
business, Tycoon Entertainment, a company in which Naselsky himself also had an 
equitable interest.   
Shortly thereafter, Naselsky approached Grasso to see if he would also sell a 
second property to the Chawlas.  Grasso agreed to sell the building, located at 1401 Arch 
Street, for $22.5 million.  Naselsky again represented Grasso during negotiation of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
revisions, and therefore the verbatim text of the provision in Naselsky’s particular 
manual, is unascertainable.  The revised version of the Cozen policy reads as follows: 
 
Unless approval is secured from the CEO of the firm, or 
his/her designee, in advance, all professional fees of any kind 
including legal fees of any kind, special counsel or solicitor 
fees, prosecutor salaries, executor fees, trustee fees, director 
fees, consulting fees and teaching salaries or stipends . . . 
which are generated directly or indirectly by lawyers 
employed by the firm, shall be considered to be income to 
and the property of the firm. 
 
(App. 663.) 
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sale agreement and at the closing.  For each of these two transactions, Grasso received a 
bill for services from Cozen O’Connor and paid the law firm directly. 
 Thereafter, Naselsky met with Grasso and asked for $100,000 in cash to “take care 
of [him]” for going “above and beyond the call of duty.”  (App. 134.)  Grasso initially 
responded that Naselsky had already been paid for his legal work.  After considering the 
issue further, however, Grasso inquired whether Naselsky “had gotten this approved 
through his law firm,” to which Naselsky “indicated that he had and . . . not to worry 
about it, that he had taken care of that.”  (App. 135.)  Grasso ultimately agreed to pay 
Naselsky the additional funds, but requested an invoice for tax purposes.  Naselsky sent 
him an invoice for $100,000 bearing the caption “Consulting services.”  (App. 139.)  
Grasso then wrote a check in that amount to Naselsky, dated January 19, 2006, which 
Naselsky deposited in his personal bank account. 
Naselsky also received compensation from the Chawlas stemming from these 
transactions.  In late 2005, the Chawlas wrote checks of $150,000 and $40,000 to 
Naselsky for his involvement in the sale of 1500 Walnut Street.  Naselsky assured 
Hardeep Chawla that Cozen O’Connor “allows [him] to do that,” meaning that it 
permitted him to receive such payments directly.  (App. 186–87.)  In July 2006, Naselsky 
left Cozen O’Connor and joined the law firm of Blank Rome.  At that time the Chawlas, 
through Sant Properties, owed approximately $469,000 to Cozen O’Connor in unpaid 
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legal bills stemming from work for which Naselsky had been the billing attorney.  (App. 
79–80.)2 
 In early 2009, Naselsky learned that he was under investigation by federal 
authorities for failure to report on his tax returns the $190,000 he received from the 
Chawlas and the $100,000 he received from Grasso.
3
  Through a series of email ruses, 
Naselsky unsuccessfully attempted to convince both the management at Blank Rome, 
where he remained employed, and the United States Attorney’s Office that the $190,000 
he had received from the Chawlas in 2005 was in fact a personal loan from a business 
acquaintance rather than unreported income.  
On September 7, 2010, Naselsky was indicted by a federal grand jury for tax 
evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Counts One and Two); filing a false tax return, 
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(l) (Counts Three and Four); wire fraud, and aiding and 
abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2 (Counts Five, Six, and 
Seven); and attempting to obstruct justice, and aiding and abetting an attempt to obstruct 
justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 2 (Counts Eight and Nine). 
At trial, the founder and chairperson of Cozen O’Connor, Stephen Cozen, testified 
that Naselsky had not sought prior approval from the firm regarding his personal 
                                              
2
 The Government also offered evidence that between September 2006 and 
January 2007, after Naselsky had left Cozen O’Connor, he received six checks for 
$15,000 each from the Chawlas for his involvement in a 2005 purchase of property which 
did not involve Grasso.  Because those payments are not central to any of Naselsky’s 
claims on appeal, we will not address them. 
 
3
 An agent for the Internal Revenue Service testified at trial that based on these 
unreported transactions and others, Naselsky had incurred an unpaid tax bill of roughly 
$115,000.   
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acceptance of funds from Grasso or the Chawlas, nor did he disclose those sums to the 
firm after receiving them.  Cozen stated that he and the firm “[a]bsolutely” would have 
considered the payments received by Naselsky to be property of the firm.  (App. 84.)  He 
further opined that any senior member of the firm, or in fact any  “average intelligent 
human being” would have understood that “finder’s fees” and “commissions” were 
among the types of payments covered by the 2001 Cozen Policy.  (App. 90–91.) 
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, Naselsky moved for a 
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 on Counts Five, Six, 
and Seven of the indictment on the theory that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding of intent to commit wire fraud.  The District Court denied the motion.  On 
September 24, 2012, a jury found Naselsky guilty on all counts. 
 At sentencing on November 20, 2012, the parties agreed that Naselsky’s base 
offense level was 21 and his criminal history category was I.  Over Naselsky’s objections, 
the District Court imposed a two-level enhancement for use of a special skill under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and a two-level enhancement for abuse of trust under the same section, 
resulting in a Guideline range of 57 to 71 months.  The Court then sentenced Naselsky to 
70 months of incarceration, near the top of the Guideline range.  Naselsky filed a timely 
notice of appeal on November 30, 2012. 
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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 We exercise plenary review over a defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims. 
See United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 1999).  We also give plenary review 
to legal questions regarding the applicability of the Sentencing Guidelines, including with 
respect to whether a defendant occupied a position of trust.  See United States v. DeMuro, 
677 F.3d 550, 567 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  Factual findings, such as whether the defendant abused that position of trust to 
commit the offense, are reviewed for clear error.  Id. 
III.  
 Naselsky argues that the Government failed to establish specific intent to defraud 
with respect to Counts Five, Six, and Seven of the indictment, which charged wire fraud.  
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal “bears a heavy 
burden.”  United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992).  Sitting en banc, we 
have recently described that standard as follows: 
We “review the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  [United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 
2005)].  Under this particularly deferential standard, we 
“must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by 
weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or 
by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.”  Id. 
Furthermore, “we review the evidence as a whole, not in 
isolation, and ask whether it is strong enough for a rational 
trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  [United 
States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)].  We must 
sustain the jury’s verdict “if there is substantial evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to 
uphold the jury's decision.”  United States v. Gambone, 314 
F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  We 
also recognized the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the verdict must be upheld as long 
as it does not ‘fall below the threshold of bare rationality.’”  Id. (quoting Coleman v. 
Johnson, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012)). 
 To prove wire fraud, the Government must establish the following three elements: 
“(1) the defendant's knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of . . . interstate wire 
communications in furtherance of the scheme.”  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 
261 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
358 (2010).  The Government may prove intent to defraud by way of circumstantial 
evidence.  See United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 333 (3d Cir. 2010).  The scheme at 
issue may involve an “affirmative misrepresentation,” but can also be predicated upon 
“omissions reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and 
comprehension.”  Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir. 
1991) (quoting United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
The only element at issue here is whether the Government proved that Naselsky 
had a specific intent to defraud Cozen O’Connor.4  Naselsky submits that he could not 
                                              
4
 The District Court’s instruction on that element, which is not challenged by 
Naselsky, is as follows: 
 
The second element that the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that Charles Naselsky acted with specific 
intent to defraud.  To act with specific intent to defraud 
means to act knowingly and with the intention or the purpose 
to deceive or to cheat. 
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have committed fraud by withholding the funds at issue because the 2001 Cozen policy 
“was at best ambiguous” regarding the types of income accruing to the firm rather than 
the employee.  Appellant’s Br. at 25.  Stated differently, Naselsky urges that “no rational 
fact finder could have found that [he] intended to violate a policy that did not apply to 
him on its face.”  Id. at 17.  This position depends on Naselsky’s characterization of the 
sums he received from Grasso and the Chawlas as “finder’s fees” which were purely “a 
reward” for his limited role in introducing those parties to one another.  Id. at 16.  He 
suggests that because this act of introduction “was completed in a virtual instant,” 
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 11, he did not draw upon the time or resources of Cozen 
O’Connor such that the firm would be entitled to the proceeds.  
Assuming that Naselsky’s position is a plausible view of the facts presented at 
trial, it does not follow that the evidence was insufficient to support the view apparently 
adopted by the jury, i.e., that the funds were due to Cozen O’Connor under the 2001 
Cozen policy because they stemmed from deal-making inseparable from Naselsky’s 
operations as a practiced real-estate attorney.  Stated otherwise, the jury finding of intent 
to defraud Cozen O’Connor does not “fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”  
Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2065.  On this record, the jury was capable of finding that 
Naselsky, using precisely the same relationships and legal expertise for which he was 
paid by Cozen O’Connor, brokered two substantial real-estate transactions and then 
obtained additional compensation for his professional work in those very matters.  Even 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
(App. 431.) 
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without relying on the interpretation of the 2001 Cozen policy supplied by the firm’s 
chairperson, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that the payments 
obtained by Naselsky from Grasso and the Chawlas constituted “professional fees” due to 
Cozen O’Connor, (App. 666), and that Naselsky possessed a specific intent to defraud the 
firm with respect to those fees.  
Naselsky also claims that a scheme to defraud cannot be predicated upon mere 
omissions where the duty to disclose stems solely from a contract.  See Appellant’s Reply 
Br. at 5–7 (citing United States v. Steffen, 687 F.3d 1104, 1116 (8th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 899–901 (4th Cir. 2000)).  In other words, because he was 
under no fiduciary or other legal obligation in addition to his contractual duty to report 
the payments at issue to his law firm, Naselsky suggests he cannot be held liable in fraud 
for passively failing to comply with a contractual condition of employment.  At most, he 
contends, this would amount to a breach of contract. 
 The cases cited by Naselsky clarify, however, that conduct involving affirmative 
concealment, such as “deceptive acts or contrivances intended to hide information, 
mislead, avoid suspicion, or prevent further inquiry into a material matter” is, like an 
affirmative misrepresentation, sufficient to establish fraud.  Steffen, 687 F.3d at 1115 
(quoting Colton, 231 F.3d at 899).  Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Government, the record shows that Naselsky assured both Grasso and the Chawlas 
that Cozen O’Connor permitted him to accept the payments at issue.  These 
representations not only induced the remittances, but also reduced the likelihood that 
Grasso and the Chawlas might attempt to confirm the propriety of Naselsky’s request 
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with other lawyers at Cozen O’Connor.  Later, Naselsky crafted a string of misleading 
emails to create the perception that the payments from the Chawlas were personal loans 
rather than income that might be due, in part or in whole, to Cozen O’Connor or Blank 
Rome.  Because these actions had the effect of minimizing the defrauded party’s 
likelihood of discovering the wrong, we conclude that the Government’s proof was 
sufficient to sustain the verdict.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment of conviction on the wire fraud counts. 
IV.  
Naselsky also challenges the District Court’s application of sentencing 
enhancements to his wire fraud convictions for use of a special skill and abuse of trust.  
Both enhancements arise under § 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which directs a 
two-level increase where “the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or 
used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. 
A position of “public or private trust” is “characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference).”  Id. at cmt. n.1.  We apply a three-part test to determine 
whether someone occupies a position of trust: “(1) whether the position allows the 
defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which the 
position vests in defendant vis-a-vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there 
has been a reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the position.”  United States 
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v. Hart, 273 F.3d 364, 376 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 
1192 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
Here, the theory of the Government’s case was that Naselsky abused his trusted 
position as a senior member of Cozen O’Connor to deprive the firm of professional fees 
derived from his practice of law.  The Government adduced evidence that Naselsky alone 
was in an authoritative position to seek the additional payments at issue from his clients 
and business partners, and to convince them that he had permission from the firm to do 
so.  Further, Naselsky concedes that the firm did not monitor his tax filings, which in any 
event would not have disclosed the challenged payments, and instead relied on his 
integrity to self-report payments possibly implicating the 2001 Cozen policy.  On these 
facts, we conclude that (1) Naselsky was in a position of trust for purposes of the 
sentencing enhancement, and (2) the District Court’s factual finding that Naselsky abused 
his position of trust to commit the offense of wire fraud against his employer was not 
error.  The two-level enhancement for abuse of trust was thus properly applied. 
Next, we consider the District Court’s application of an enhancement for use of a 
special skill.  “Special skill” is defined as “a skill not possessed by members of the 
general public and usually requiring substantial education, training or licensing.”  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1314 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Naselsky does not dispute that as an attorney he possessed special professional 
skills.  Instead, in accord with his argument that the fees at issue would have been paid to 
any person who brought Grasso and the Chawlas together for business, he contends that 
his actions here amounted to little more than introducing two acquaintances and 
13 
 
depositing checks into his personal bank account, neither of which requires special skill.  
As explained by the District Court, however, the Government introduced evidence that 
Naselsky “used his skill to set up [the transactions between Grasso and the Chawlas] so 
that he was in a position to ask for these commission finder’s fees, and that did require 
special skill.”  (App. 456.)  Indeed, the record reveals that the wrongdoing at issue was 
enabled predominantly, if not exclusively, by Naselsky’s application of his abilities as an 
experienced real-estate lawyer.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not 
commit plain error in applying the “special skill” enhancement on these facts. 
V.  
 In sum, we reject Naselsky’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to his 
convictions on Counts Five, Six, and Seven of the indictment, and conclude that the 
District Court committed no error in applying sentencing enhancements for abuse of trust 
and use of a special skill.  We will affirm the conviction and sentence. 
